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This paper considers the theory of Directly Unproductive Profit Seeking (DUP) activities, 
examining its imphcations for economic theory. Two classes of DUP activjties are distinguished: 
one where the DUP activity is triggered by policy which is itself exogenously specified (e.g., 
tariff-revenue s&king resulting from pre-specified tariff); the other where DUP activity 
endogenises policy fully (e.g., tariff seeking). Implications for both positive and normative 
argumentation in economic theory are considered in depth for both these classes of DUP 
activity. 
1. In~~uction 
Recently, severa! economists have directed their tale, ts to examining the 
impact of what h.ave been christened [Bhagwati (1 tS2a)] as Directly- 
Unproductive Profit-seeking (DUP) activities. b.mong the more prominent 
such contributors, distinguished by different ‘schools’ of thought, are (i) 
Buchanan, Tullock and otter important members of the public-choice 
schooi, with their major work now conveniently collected in Buchanan, 
Tulfock and Tollison (1980) and reviewed well ‘n Tollison (1982); (ii) 
Bhagwati, Findlay, Hansen, Krueger, Magee, SrirYi’Irasan, Wellisz and other 
international economists, whose work is reviewed and systematized in 
qwati (“1982a); (iii) Becker (1983), ltzman, Posner, Stlgler and orher 
mbers oi’ the Chicago school, whose otable work is variously available; 
and (iv) Lindbeck (19X), whose influential work on ‘endogenous politicians’ 
is widely k~~ow~. 
While considerable progress has been made in formally analyzing indi- 
*Bhagwati’s research has been supported by the Nat’ aJ Science ~ou~dat~o~. This paper was 
presented, in an ~~~1~~~ version, al i conference at ldd~e~~ry Colkge, and ~611 appear in 
seiect.ed procmdings of the c rence: David Colander ed., NeocFossical 
hulysis if ~e~t-see~~~~ and 
0014-2921/84/$3.00 8 1984, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holiand) 
292 J.N. Bhagwati Ed al., DUP activities and economic theory 
vi&ml DUP phenomena (e,g., revenue seeking, tariff seeking, rnt~~o~o~y see- 
king, etc.) in recent works that integrate them ints 
neral equilibrium models, at te pts at s!~irhesizing t 
recently: among them are Buchanan ( IY&O) and hagwati (l!M?a). In this 
paper, we propose to examine a sonIcwhat differs: but equally general and 
ambitious question: how scrims for economic theory, as c~nventiona~$y 
practiced, is the systematic integration of DUP phenomena into our a 
§ection 2 defines DUP activities and lays out a suitable taxonomy o 
categories or types which will serve our later analysis. Section 3 then 
nsiders the inrpiications of different DUP categories for positive analysis. 
ction 4 addresses welfare or normative implications. 
The essential cl-taracteristic of the phenomena which this volume addresses, 
and which the many ‘schools’ of thought distinguished above analyze, is that 
they represent ways of making a profit (i.e., income) by undertaking activities 
which are directly unproductive; that is, they yield pecuniary returns but 
prcduce neither goods and services that enter a conventional utility function 
directly nor intermediate inputs into such goods and services. Insofar as such 
‘vities use real resources, they result in a contraction of the availability set 
n to the economy. Thus, for example, tariff-seeking lobbying, tariff 
evasion, and premi ‘i seeking for given import licenses are all privately 
profitable activities. owever, their dire& output is simply zero in terms of 
the How of goods and services entering a conventional utility function. For 
ample, tar-8 seeking yields pecuniary income by changing the tariff and 
nce factor rewards; eva.sion of a tariff yields pecuniary income by 
exploiting the differential price between legal (tariff-bearing) imports and 
ihegal {tariff-evading) imports; and premium seeking yields pecuniary income 
from the premia on import licenses. [Krueger’s (1974) analysis of what she 
ed ‘rent-seeking’ activities relates to a subset of the broad class of 
UP activities: she is concerned with the lobbying activities which are 
triggered by differ-en t licensing practices of governments. l] 
viewpoint of the analysis presented bellow, activities cdn be 
generic types.” The distinction is een in t reducing 
els where the policy itself is endqenously 
activity with the otherwise ~)rthodox 
er focus is on ~~~s~~~~~a~ttity res rictions and the rem thereon, and her generic set of 
activities excludes from its scope other DUP activities such as price-distortion- 
UP tortion-triggering DUP activities. For a fuller analysis of the 
an 
rhsu:d ~~s~~t 
cal, between DUP and ‘rent seeking’ activities, the reader 
“Otfier ck~&C~attorrs, address& 
t I %hj synthasis 8f the w&are OF 
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‘pure’ economic system, and where the activity 
re :he policy is exogenous/y specified while the 
to that policy. Examples’ of the former, using 
tariff theory, are models where the tariff is endogenously determined; 
f the latter are models whese a tariff exogenously specified to be in 
to seeking for the revenues resulting from the tariff, and models 
where the tariff is evaded. The former class of UP activities raises deeper 
questions for economic analysis than the latter, as we will contend below. 
3. itive 
3. I. Exoganous policy 
When the policy which induces DU activity is exogenously specified, the 
implications of such DUP activity for positive analysis are tantamount to 
introducing an essentially non-traded sector into the formal model. Thus, 
depending on the problem and the model, the analytical conclusions derived, 
on which po!icy intuitions are based, will change. We illustrate this by briefly 
considering two recent DUP-theoretic analyses in tariff and transfer theory: 
revenue seeking in wati and Srinivasan (198Oj and transfer seeking in 
Bhagwati, Brecher an atta (1982). 
X1.1. Revenue see/&g and the Metzler paradox 
Convent’onal trade theory tells us that, provided suitable convexity 
assumptions are satisified, a small country will find that a tariff will 
necessarily increase the domestic price and hence the output of the protected. 
good. The Metzler paradox is that, for a large country (i.e., one that can 
influence its terms of trade), the tariff leads to such an improvement in the 
international terms of trade that the tariff-inclusive domestic price of the 
importable good falls and hence the importable good is paradoxically 
deprote;ted. We thus have the etzler price and hence, what we can 
c’hristen, the Metzler produchon paradox, in the c,,nventional 2 x 2 model of 
tr theory .
wati and S~n~vasal~ 
assuming a small co 
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Fig. 1 
Good X (Exportable) 
that competitive revenue seeking leads to diversion of one dollar worth of 
resources for every dollar worth of revenue, then the equilibrium will shift in 
Fig. 1 such that consumption is at cy on the national-income-at-market-price 
budget line PC,,, and production is at ii, where the world price line c,p,, 
intersects the generalized Rybczynski line BR (which reflects successive 
withdrawals of resources for revenue seeking, at the given tariff-inclusive 
prices). Trade is defined by c, and P,, tariff revenue is equal to the dashed 
distance $,, which, in turn, exactly equals (given the one-on-one 
ption) the value of resources diverted to revenue se since it is 
to the vaiue of reduced output of 
determined wages and rentals to fat 
production being determined at p, and earned income in 
e revenue anti both adding up to OQ’ 
expenditure or budget. 
revenue seeking 
as th.e national 
Note then that Fig. 1 (as drawn) shows the production of the imported 
good Y at P, as less than at P*: the Metzler production paradox obtains. 
The conventional ‘substitution’ effect of the tariff does protect, taking 
production from P to P; but this is more than offset by the ‘income’ effect 
of the induced revenue seeking that shi s production aga.in, to P,, given that 
the (generalized) Rybczynski line is pos vely sloped in the present example. 
3.1.2. Tran&v seeking and the terms- +-trade-change csiteriorl 
An application of this analysis to the transfer problem can again be shown 
to change dramatically the conventional criterion for change in the terms of 
trade - as in the recent work of Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta (1982). 
Thus, ct>nsider the case where the transfer, instead of being received 
directly by consumers or given to them as a ‘lump-sum gift as in conventional 
analysis, goes into the governmental budget and then leads to transfer- 
seeking lobbying. [In principle, we could also assume symmetrically that the 
donor country experiences reduced lobbying when it makes the transfer: a 
case we discuss later.] Also consider again the one-on-one assumption such 
that the transfer-seeking lobbying uses up a value of domestic primary 
factors eqwll in total to the amount of the transfer. This situation is analyzed 
in fig. 2. 
Initially, the recipient country produces on i;s production-possibility 
frontier F,I ‘X at point P, consumes on its social indifference curve V,K at 
point C, and trades with the donor country (the rest of the world) along 
price line PC from point P to point C. For starters, consider the case where 
the terms of trade can not change. 
In the small-country case, the transfer has of course no tipact on the 
goods-price ratio. The transfer-seeking activity of lobbyists, however, causes 
output in the recipient to move down the generalii.ed Rybczynski line PR 
until production reaches I”, where the value of national output has fallen by 
the amount of the transfer to the level repres:nted by the .-ice line (parallel 
Since this value of output plus e transfer equals 
sumption remains at point C. , the transfer has 
to enrich the recipient. 
ient’s welfare could actually decline, 
consumptives curvy) 
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Fig. 2 
Good X 
this commodity would rise to clear worid markets. As the equi.librium price 
line steepens from the initial positibll PC, the recipient must reach a lower 
indi’fference urve, provided that the relative price of X does uot rise above 
the autarkic llevel (where an indifference curve would touch curve FJJ. 
similar reas’oning, the opposite ranking of marginal propensities would lead 
to a fall it: ‘the world price of good X, and hence enrichment of the recipient. 
also the symmetric case 
ent country is matched 
the donor. To make the symmetry 
e resource-use o
produce Iits own importable is greater (less) than the donor’s marginal 
ce this good. 
3.2. Endogenous policy 
enization of policy via DUP activity is also subversive of 
traditional intuitions, aditio~a~~y~ economists are trained to think of 
governments as ‘neutr in positive analysis and of economic agents to 
compete, perfectly or imperfectly, in alternative types of market 
environments. Once policy is endogenized, this tradition must ne ressarily be 
undermined. For, some or all economic age?+ may now also operate to have 
policy defined in their favour; there ic a non-economic, or non-traditional, 
marketplace, as it were, in which economic agents can simultaneously 
conduct their profitmaking activities.3 We thus have two components of the 
overall model: the orthodox ‘economic’ specification and t 
specification where profit motivation may equally extend and where the 
economic returns accrue through induced-policy changes influencing 
economic returns l;n the traditionally ‘economic’ sphere of the model. 
While we will deal later with the critical implication of this transformation 
in modelling policy for orthodox welfare-theoretic analysis, we mention here 
simply that, as with the exogenous-policy DUP activities analyzed earlier, the 
results in positive analysis are sensitive to this basic change in the way the 
total economic system is modelled. For example, the customary view is that, 
given an exogenousl-,+specifieCl tariff, an improvement in the terms of trade 
will reduce the dcqnestic prod &ion of the importable good in an economy 
with given resources, well-behaved technology and perfect markets, But this 
conclusion eed not follow, or may be seriously weakened, if the effect of the 
terms of trade change is to trigger tariff-seeking lobbying successfully. 
While there is indeed a vast literature on ‘political economy’ models which 
endogenise policy through DUP-activity specification i  a variety of contexts, 
several efforts of a general-equilibrium type have emerged recently in trade- 
theoretic literature in titular. We will ve an indication here of the 
nature of these mode of &C early papers on tariff 
sr;kirg:” Findlay and r eenstra and wati ( I%!). 
These papers may be way. 
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ati, there is only one 
import competition) which engages in lo 
Ohlin--E&mu&on model. 
(ii) The age:nts lobby to have a cy adopted or to oppose it. In both 
Findlay--Wellisz and Feenstra licy is ~~i~~~~y d ~~ed 
to be a tariff. 
‘government’, as an econva ie agent, is not explicit in Findlay- 
ellisa. The cost-of-kbbying tions which postulate the tariff’ as a 
function off the lobbying resources pent in proposing and oppos 
tariff arc: kqlicibiy assuming a government which is subject to 
opposing lobbying efforts and whatever preferences the government has 
are reflected impkitly in the postulated function. n the other hand, in 
Feenstra-Bhagwati, here is a Z-layer government: he lobbying process 
interacts with one branch of government (e.g., the legklature) to enact a 
Lobbying Tur$ whereas another branch of the government (e.g., the 
President in the U.S.) then comes into the picture to use the tariff 
revenues generated by the lobbying tariff to bribe the lobby into 
acqgting a di!Terent, welfare-superior Deficient Tarzr which yields to the 
lobby, from both the revenue bribe plus the earned income from the 
market place at the efficierit ariff, the same income as from the lobbying 
tariff. 5 
These papers then define rather well how the theoretical analysis of 
endogenous policymaking can be approached in the ~~~ventio~a~ ma 
economic theory. By taking a simple set of political-cum-economic 
assumptions, they manage to get a neat, simple model working. In 
a pedagogic viewpoint, the extension of the traditional 2 x 2 x 2 
trade theory model to an augmented 2x 2 x 2 x 2 model, where there are 2 
rent directions. 
terest is the role 
3rnment is ‘act 
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cIassic analys& of n-hximum-revenue tariff y :aids., of course, in a 
where other fX0nOmic agents Lie not engaged i;m 
~x~~~~e~ instead rather on %e dimension of the 
c agents can L-bby in response to 
to tariffs, one can consider policy 
instruments in regard to international factor and techrtological flows. 
Without formally incorporating them into a model that end srgenously yiel&, 
the sq’dilibrium choice or policy-mix of instruments in response to import 
competition, Bhagwati (1982a, b), Sapir (1983), and Dinopoulos (1983) have 
analyzed the prefirences that different economic agents could hate between 
these instruments when faced by import competition (i.e., inqroved terms of 
trade). Such analyses throw light on the incentives for lobbGng far different 
policy adoptions by the government and hence yield the necessary insights 
into why certain policy options rather than others emerge as actual responses 
to import competition. 
Again, we will consider exogenous and endogenous policies successively. 
4. !. Exogenous poli&~s 
The welfare effects of specific policirs, and of parametric hanges in the 
presence of exogenously specified policies, can be extremely sensitive to 
whether induced DUP activities are built into the model or not. Again, we 
take two telling instances. 
(0 hagwati and Srinivasan ( 1982), following on Foster’s (1981) work, have 
shown that sbadow prices for primary factors in a small, t 
open economy are different, depending on wPi&kaer the tar 
not resulted in rc;venue (- eking. Iln fact, tht shadow rices can be shown 
s whew revenue seeking obtains. 
(ii) e will also show rc that, whiie the ~o~ve~tio~~~ ra 
ion tax or a cons 
-ordering gets reversed if t 
he shadow prices for a small, tariff-distorted economy are known from 
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the cost-benefit literature to & derivable as ihe dualzs to the world goods 
prices at the distorted te~;hn~qul~s. n the othe: hand, it is obvious from ;he 
fact that i,f revenue seeking is present, 8s in fig. 1, the economy operates on 
the national-expenditure., social-budget Eine CRetined at the market, tariff- 
inclusive rices. Therefole, a marginal withdrawal of factors from the 
distorted, UP equilibrium will evidently imply an o ~~u~~ty cost 
refiecting the market prices.6 To put it another way, 
sought away, the consumer exwnditure on goods e 
prices for factors. And these factor prices and goods 
long as incomplete specialization continues), a3 we 
thanks to the tariff. As such, :‘le value of change in the labour (capital) 
endowment by a unit is its market reward: hence the shadow factor 
this DUP-activity-inclusive model are the market prices.’ The inv 
sttikes again! 
4.1.2. P&y rankings with revenue seeking 
Recall that, for a small economy, a consumption tax on the importable 
(production tax cm the exportable) is welfare superior to a tariff at The same 
ad valorem rate since it avoids the additional production (consumption) loss 
associated wit1 the tariff. It turns out that once full revenue seeking Q fh 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980) is unleashed by the imposition of any tax, 
this welfare rar;king is reversed. This is seeq as follows. 
With tariff at an ad valorem rate t, let the output vector of the econom,y be 
ue seeking. Let the free-trade (i.e., zero-tari output 
zth full revenue seeking under the tariff, consumers 
maximize utility given a relative price of (I + t) of the importable good Y 
(with the world relative pri’:e norinalized at unity) and income Y equal to [X’ + 
(I+ t) Y’“]. They thus derive utility v( 1 + t, Xi +(I + t) Y’) expressed in terms 
of their indirect utility function v(p, Y). Qn the other hand, with a 
consumption tax at an ad vtsfomn rate t and full revenue seeking, they face 
the same price (1 +t) but an income of (X” G I”), thus obtaining utility: 
~~a~imizes the valu 
H with full ~ev~~~~ see
tion tax with full reve 
g. 3? Without any 
‘%us, as Anam (1982) has shown, Johnson’s (PM) type of ~~ise~~~ ~r~~wth in the 
presmce of a tariff is impossible wben all tariff revenues are sought. 
are aulkject o SW 
tic am~~ys~s of a cons88 
at a tax mi 
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Pncoae - consumption 
curve for distorted 
pr:ce ratio (1 +tl 
Fx Q Good X 
Fig. 3 
seeking and free trade, equilibrium production is at (X0, Y*). With a tariff, 
production shifts at relative price ratio (1 + t) to (X’, Y’). With tariff-revenue 
seeking, consumption is at Ci, as shown in fig. t also. Shift, however, to a 
consumption tax on good Y with attendant revenue-seeking. Production then 
remains at (X0, Y”) and the income, measured in terms of good X, is OQ, 
and is spent at the consumption-tax-inclusive price ratio (1 + t) along QCE, 
taking consumption to Cc,. Fig. 3 ailso shows production in the consumption- 
tax-cum-seeving equilibrium, It is given at pf by tire intersection of the world 
price line fr0m c an yoczynski line for :he world 
price ratio (unity) a6 at C: dominates that at 17’;: 
the tariff is superior to the cons~rn~t~o~~ tat. 




under an indentical production tax, wlm full revenue seeking obtains in 
each case. 
The intuitive explanation of these results is evidently that, with no revenue 
seekkg, a conmnpPion (production) tax generates more revenue than a tariff 
at thle same rate,g the reason being that the offsetting production 
(conmmption) subsidy effect of a tariff is absent. In effect, what we are 
getting into is a &uation where there are two distortions, rather than one, 
associated with e:lcb of the policies being ranked: the direct distor:lon 
implied by the policy itself and the indirect distortion implied by the 
(indumd) DUP activity. 
considered here is that 
ilyst has to be alerted 
iXlalySis of transfers, 
9 
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exactkg a reparation pay t will always be 
t 4.2 the resulting transfer in a ah-as-stable market. 
ever, fade transfer seeking is permitted, this is no longer so! Thus, 
case of a ‘large’ recipien untry, as discussed above in fig. 2. If the 
de worsen in this P-activity-inclusive 2x 2 model, that is 
ent to immiserize the recipient in a Walras-stable market whereas by 
contrast such deterioration in the terms of trade cannot ever be large enough 
to offset the primary gain from the transfer in a Walras-stable market in the 
orthodox non- UP-activity 2 x 2 model. 
need to re-examine a number of policy intuitions if policies 
activities in the real world, as they indeed do. The world lies 
somewhere along the continuum defined by two end points: one where no 
DUP activity is induced and the other where DUP activity is induced fully 
(on a one-to-one basis). lo But while we have charted reasonably in depth the 
former end, we are only begip?ing to understand and sketch the latter end. 
An agenda for research to map out the latter landscape clearly awaits a new 
generation of researchers in all branches of economic theory. 
4.2. Endogenous policy 
A far more critical question is raised, however, once you fully endogenise 
P-theoretic models. Exploiting our comparative advantage, we 
r again a trade-theoretic example to raise and probe this issu.e. 
Take a tariffseeking model of any species that you prefer. The endogenous 
tariff that emerges then in such a model may be illustrated in fig. 5. F’“F”” is 
the production possibility curve when all resources are deployed for 
producing X and Y and an exogenous tariff leads this small economy from 
P* at given world prices to paK under protection. But now the model is 
au ented to endogenise the tariff and, in equilibrium, resources are used up 
in tariff-seeking DUP activity and the tariff-inclusive quilibrium is at Be”. 
The production possibility curve .F”“F”” is a hypothetical construct, taking 
the endowment of factors as net of those used up in tariff seeking equilibrium: 
oods price ratio must thereface tJe t t to it at Ben. It 
rse, that reve ue-seeking-adduced activity is not 
simultaneously present here.’ I 
easure the cost of 
ate way to do it 
tic if, as Tullock (1981) has suggested, seeking 
rize than the value of the prize itself, 
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Fig. 5 
to ii* as the standard production cost of protection (reflecting the distortion 
of prices faced by producers) and the further move from p* to P* as the 
added cost of tariff-seeking lobbying (reflecting the loss due to resource 
d.iversion to lobbying). Ii[ence the total cost of protection in an endogenous- 
tar8 model would be AF, reflecting the comparison between the free-trade- 
equilibrium position at P* and the endogenous-tarikT-equilibrium position at 
F. In turn, it is decomposed then into AB , the conventional ‘cost of 
protection’, and BF, the ‘lobbyin cost’. It might be appr riate perhaps to 
total cost as e ‘protectionist ocess’, to avoid 
tween .4F and 
bile this analytical i~mov~~t~o~ to extend the tr~dit~o~a~ cost-of- 
rote&on analysis to the case where the tariff is e~do~~~ous may be 
plauded, it raises the dee r question that we now wish to address. 
“‘Bhagwati (1980) also shows that it is incorrect to argue that the cost of zc endogenous tar% 
ari[r at This propositlon involves comparing 
I: endogenous tariff can be lelss 
rsbkm with the 
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e the tariff is endogenise it will genera!?y be determined uniqueiy as 
at ~t~Qu~~, oi course, multiple equilbria can be introduced as readily as 
in co~ve~tio~a~ ‘strictiy-economic’ models), To compare this outcome with a 
~y~~t~etica~ free-trade policy leading to P* is to compare a policy choice 
that is made as a solution to the entire, augmented economic-cum-policy- 
oice system with a wholly hypothetical policy that descends like manna 
from heaven! Such a comparison makes obvious sense, of course, when we 
take policies as sxogenous: we are then simply varying them, given the 
conventional economic system, and reading off their welfare consequences. 
But, with only one policy outcome determined endogenously, the comparison 
between it and another hypothetical policy arrived at by exogenous 
specification, while of course possible, is not compelling. It is virtually as if 
we had wir, t out one (the ‘political’) side of our model for our point of 
reference! 
It would appear therefore tbqt we need lto chmge the way we pose welfare- 
theoretic questions once policies are endogenised critically, as irr the 
foregoing analysis. Thus, it is not particulary meaningful to rank-order 
policies as in traditional analysis, once policies are endogenous. Nor is it 
appropriate to compare them vis-a-vis a reference point (such as P* in fig. 3) 
which reflects an exogenously-specified policy. 
Rather, it would appear that the analyst must now shift fbcus and 
concentra.te on ~~~riations around the endugenous equilibrium itself (i.e., around 
Pen in fig. 3) Thus, it is customary to ask what happens, given a policy, to 
welfare when accumulation comes about, or when technical knowhow 
changes, etc. We can rephrase these questions as follows, keeping in mind 
that there are now two parts of the overall economic :b;ystem: ‘economic’ and 
‘political’: what will happen to welfare if, on the economic side of the model, 
these chanp:s such as accumulation, technical progress etc. occur; and what 
Fsppcns ii changes occur instead on the political side such as an increased 
cost of lobbying for a tariff if there is an exogenous hift in attitudes against 
protection. ?I3 In short, the overall system must be solved for endogenous 
policy change and for final welfare impact for parametric hanges that tail 
occur now eitlrer in the ‘economic’ or equally in the ‘pohtical’ side of the 
olferall, augmented system. A interesting way to decompose the overall 
welfare impact of such param tric changes III either the ‘economic’ or the 
“political’ side of the system could be to assume first that olicy does remain 
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